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COMMENT 
INJUSTICE AT THE BORDER: APPLICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION ABROAD THROUGH  
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
MARGARET KOPEL† 
Deciding whether the U.S. Constitution applies abroad is a complicated question 
and one that is not easily answered by looking at Supreme Court precedent. The 
problems of the current approach have been highlighted in recent years by the cases of 
Hernandez v. Mesa and Rodriguez v. Swartz, two cross-border shooting cases 
where courts were unsure as to how or why different Amendments could protect 
noncitizen children killed in Mexico by U.S. government agents shooting from within 
the United States. This Comment surveys the precedents as well as the leading 
theories in extraterritorial application of the Constitution and shows why the 
landscape as we face it is unsatisfactory for dealing with cases like Hernandez and 
Rodriguez. Interest analysis, within the conflict of laws, asks courts to look at the 
purpose of a law domestically and to extend that law abroad if its domestic purpose 
would be served by doing so. I argue that under this approach, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment should be extended abroad because its domestic purpose in 
restraining arbitrary executive action is served by restraining that Executive no 
matter where it acts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 7, 2010, a Mexican teenager named Sergio Hernandez was 
playing with his friends near the U.S.–Mexico border, running back and forth 
along the narrow concrete culvert that separates the two countries.1 Border 
Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa was patrolling the area on bike, and grabbed one of 
the boys as they ran down the culvert.2 Sergio ran and hid behind a concrete 
pillar on the Mexico side of the border.3 “Within seconds,” Agent Mesa shot 
Sergio in the head, killing him instantly.4 Mesa was standing on the U.S. side 
of the border and Sergio, a mere sixty feet away, was on the Mexico side.5 
Agent Mesa initially claimed that the boys had been throwing rocks at him 
and that he acted in self-defense, but cellphone video later surfaced 
disproving this story.6 
 
1 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *4, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. at *5. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. at *5-6. 
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As is often the case, only the executive branch was left responsible for 
determining the consequences of this killing, a process that has largely 
immunized the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.7 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
Department of Justice did not find sufficient evidence to prosecute, and so 
the only consequences for Agent Mesa were determined by an internal agency 
review.8 The Mexican government attempted to extradite Agent Mesa, but 
the U.S. government denied that request.9 And, in what will be the focus of 
this Comment, when Sergio’s family brought suit in federal court, as their 
only remaining avenue for redress, their suit was ultimately dismissed, 
leaving Agent Mesa with no legal consequences and the family of Sergio with 
no justice for the seemingly unjustified killing of their child.10 
In this Comment, I will examine the constitutional jurisprudence that led 
to Hernandez v. Mesa, which shows an obvious lack of cohesion and guiding 
theory. I will also survey some of the leading theories as to extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. Constitution, none of which are satisfactory in a case 
like Hernandez. I will first argue that in this and similar cases, the plaintiffs’ 
claims can be analyzed under the Fifth Amendment, rather than exclusively 
under the Fourth Amendment. I will then argue that the best theory to use 
in analyzing extraterritorial application of the Constitution is interest 
analysis, from conflict of laws theory, which asks whether a law’s domestic 
purpose would be served by its application abroad. Under this analysis, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, designed to restrain executive 
action no matter against whom it is directed, has clear applicability in cases 
like Hernandez. By using interest analysis, we can create a more cohesive 
constitutional theory and develop more robust protections for those harmed 
by U.S. executive action at home and abroad. 
 
7 See Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 271 (5th Cir. 2014) (“If the Constitution does 
not apply here, the only check on unlawful conduct would be that which the Executive Branch 
provides.”); Roxanna Altholz, Elusive Justice: Legal Redress for Killings by U.S. Border Agents, 27 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4 (explaining that despite the large number of border shootings, not one 
civil plaintiff has prevailed at trial, federal prosecutors have failed to bring charges in all cases but 
one, and all extradition requests by Mexico have been denied). 
8 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at *6-7. 
9 See id. at *7. 
10 I say “seemingly unjustified” because defendants filed a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, and so 
even though the case reached the Supreme Court, the discovery and investigation were halted at a 
very early stage of the case. 
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I. THE HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF  
THE CONSTITUTION 
The history of the Supreme Court’s approach to whether and when the 
Constitution extends abroad is muddled to say the least.11 The cases have gone 
back and forth between extending or declining to extend different provisions. 
The factual contexts of these cases vary wildly; they involve U.S. territories, 
alien enemy combatants, U.S. citizens, aliens held in detention abroad, and 
aliens detained in the United States but arrested abroad.12 Furthermore, many 
of these cases do not have clear majority opinions but are a combination of 
pluralities and multiple concurring opinions, with disagreement as to which 
opinion controls. As such, it is not surprising that academic articles, and 
courts themselves, tend to pick and choose among the cases for those that suit 
their needs most favorably. This lack of precedent or predictability highlights 
the need for an understanding of constitutional theory by the Court, and a 
move away from the functional, case-by-case decisionmaking that has led to 
this whiplash for more than a century. 
In a series of cases during the early twentieth century, known as the Insular 
Cases, the Court decided which parts of the Constitution extend to newly 
acquired territories after the Spanish-American War, such as Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines. The Court took a largely territorial approach, holding that 
“[f]ull constitutional protection was reserved for territories that Congress had 
incorporated into the United States, as opposed to those merely acquired.”13 
While declining to extend rights the Court saw as “procedural”, such as Sixth 
Amendment rights, the Court maintained that there were certain 
constitutional provisions deemed to be so fundamental that they might always 
apply, regardless of the status of a territory.14 
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,15 twenty-one German nationals were detained for 
violating war crimes for continuing aggression in China after the surrender 
 
11 See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 73 (1996) (“Developments 
since [the nineteenth century] have produced a mosaic of inconsistent rules and rationales rather than 
a true synthesis . . . .”); Eva L. Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign 
Nationals on the U.S.–Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 233 (2014) (“The Court has 
oscillated between rights-granting and rights-restricting views of the Constitution abroad.”). 
12 Throughout this Comment, I use the term “alien” to describe noncitizens. I do this for the 
sake of clarity, as this is the term the Supreme Court uses in all of the cases discussed here, but I am 
cognizant that this word is “patently offensive” as a descriptive label, as it “conjures images of 
invasion, danger, and otherworldness.” CESAR CUAUHTEMOC GARCIA HERNANDEZ, 
CRIMMIGRATION LAW 18 (Am. Bar Ass’n. 2015). 
13 Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 961 (1991). 
14 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901) (“[T]here may be a distinction between certain natural 
rights, enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and what may be termed 
artificial or remedial rights, which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence.”). 
15 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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of Germany during World War II. The prisoners were tried by a military 
commission, found guilty, and detained in Germany, where they petitioned 
for writs of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.16 The Supreme Court found that the petitioners did not have 
standing to seek the writ.17 The case is often cited for the proposition that it 
supports a territorial view of the Constitution.18 At the same time, however, 
the Court focused extensively on the fact that the petitioners were alien 
enemy combatants, and contrasted the “relative vulnerability” of the enemy 
alien’s status during war, compared to the “security and protection” that same 
alien enjoys “while the nation of his allegiance remains in amity” with the 
United States19 The Johnson opinion could be viewed more narrowly, as 
denying constitutional protections to active alien combatants, during 
wartime, who nonetheless still received some due process.20 
Setting the stage for future decisions, Justice Black’s dissent discussed the 
fact that the U.S. government controlled the German prison where the 
petitioners were detained, even though it was outside U.S. territory.21 At the 
same time, he lamented the “broad and dangerous principle”22 being adopted 
that allowed for the Executive to control a prisoner’s constitutional rights 
based on the Executive’s chosen location of detention, asking “Does a 
prisoner’s right to test legality of a sentence then depend on where the 
Government chooses to imprison him?”23 Black pointed to the arbitrary 
results that would flow from constitutional rights being decided by the 
 
16 See id. at 765-767. 
17 See id. at 776 (“[T]he nonresident enemy alien . . . does not have even this qualified access 
to [American] courts.”). 
18 Id. at 771 (“[I]n extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has 
been at pains to point out that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave 
the Judiciary power to act.”). 
19 Id. at 771. 
20 Indeed, Johnson was distinguished in later cases by the fact that the petitioners did not 
receive no process at all, but had gone through three tribunals, albeit two of them military. See 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008) (“The Eisentrager petitioners [had] detailed factual 
allegations against them . . . they were entitled to representation by counsel, allowed to introduce 
evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
21 See Johnson, 339 U.S. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution has led people 
everywhere to hope and believe that whereever our laws control, all people, whether our citizens or 
not, would have an equal chance before the bar of criminal justice.”). 
22 Id. at 795. 
23 Id. 
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location of detention.24 He also highlighted the erosion of separation of 
powers that this decision would allow.25 
Seven years later, Justice Black wrote the Court’s opinion in Reid v. 
Covert,26 which extended constitutional rights to U.S. citizens abroad. Two 
U.S. citizen women (not in the military), who had been living at military 
bases with their enlisted husbands in England and China had killed their 
husbands and subsequently been tried and convicted by military 
commissions.27 The citizens petitioned for a writ of habeas, alleging denial of 
their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.28 
Justice Black’s forceful opinion began by stating “[t]he United States is 
entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other 
source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.”29 He went on to disavow any analysis that might focus on 
practical factors,30 or that would extend rights in a piecemeal manner.31 Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion, meanwhile, focused explicitly on the practical, 
functional analysis that would extend constitutional provisions one-by-one, 
depending on the context.32 
While the Reid opinion is important in marking a turn from the territorial 
perspective of Johnson v. Eisentrager, and explicitly limiting the effect of the 
Insular Cases,33 Reid’s scope is arguably limited, given that it was directed only 
at U.S. citizens abroad, and that Justice Black was writing for a plurality.34 
 
24 See id. (“The Court is fashioning wholly indefensible doctrine if it permits the executive 
branch, by deciding where its prisoners will be tried and imprisoned, to deprive all federal courts of 
their power to protect against a federal executive’s illegal incarcerations.”). 
25 See id. at 798 (“Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment, is 
written into the Constitution. Its use by courts cannot in my judgment be constitutionally abridged 
by Executive or by Congress.”). 
26 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
27 See id. at 4-5. 
28 See id. 
29 Id. at 5-6. 
30 Id. at 14 (“The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against 
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient . . . is a very dangerous 
doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and 
undermine the basis of our Government.”). 
31 Id. at 9 (“[W]e can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and choosing among 
the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ which were explicitly fastened on all departments and 
agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.”) 
32 Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he question is which guarantees of the 
Constitution should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the 
possible alternatives which Congress had before it.”). 
33 Id. at 14 (distinguishing the Insular Cases based on their dealing with “rules and regulations” 
for territories with “wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions”). 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990) (writing that Reid 
cannot be used to support the broad proposition that the Constitution constrains all government 
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Over thirty years later, in United States v. Verdugo-Urdiquez,35 the Court 
declined to apply the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment36 to 
operations by Drug Enforcement Agency Agents in Mexico. DEA Agents 
had arrested Verdugo-Urdiquez, a Mexican citizen, and held him in custody 
in the United States. While in custody, they searched his home in Mexico 
City, without a warrant, and Verdugo-Urdiquez filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence resulting from this search. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority 
opinion, wrote that because the Fourth Amendment references the rights of 
“the people,”37 it thus does not protect foreigners like Verdugo-Urdiquez, who 
had no “voluntary attachment” to the United States.38 
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that the 
holding of Reid v. Covert, constraining the U.S. government wherever it acts in 
the world, is correct, but that it is only the first step in the analysis.39 The analysis 
must also consider whether application of a constitutional provision in any given 
case would be “impracticable and anomalous” under the circumstances.40 
Justice Brennan’s dissent focused on the limited and enumerated powers 
of the U.S. Government, arguing that the Constitution is the only source of 
the Executive’s power to act, and thus is also the source of limitations on all 
of that action, whether at home or abroad.41 
The next decision to extend the Constitution abroad, and the last thus far, 
was Boumediene v. Bush.42 The Court extended the Suspension Clause43 to 
Guantanamo Bay, enabling all detained there, both citizen and noncitizen, to 
petition for habeas.44 Justice Kennedy spent large parts of his majority decision 
writing about the fundamental nature of the writ, and the importance of 
separation of powers.45 The ultimate test he provided, however, sounded more 
 
activity abroad, but applies only to U.S. citizens, and that the narrower concurring opinion limits 
even that reading). 
35 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”). 
37 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. 
38 See id. at 274. 
39 See id. at 277-278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
40 See id. at 278. 
41 See id. at 281 (Brennan, J. dissenting.) (“The Constitution is the source of . . . the Executive’s 
authority to investigate and prosecute such conduct. But the same Constitution also prescribes limits 
on our Government’s authority to investigate, prosecute, and punish criminal conduct, whether 
foreign or domestic.”). 
42 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
44 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (“We hold that petitioners may invoke the fundamental 
procedural protections of habeas corpus.”). 
45 See id. at 739-53. 
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like his “impracticable or anomalous” inquiry from Verdugo-Urdiquez.46 The 
Court used a three-factor test to reach its result that the Suspension Clause 
applied in Guantanamo, which considered (1) the citizenship and status of the 
plaintiff, (2) the nature of the location, and (3) the practical obstacles inherent 
in extending the constitutional provision abroad.47 
As I will discuss below, this three-factor test fails to create a coherent 
constitutional theory and does not provide guidance for how and when the 
constitution should apply abroad in a case like Hernandez. 
II. THE HERNANDEZ CASE 
Operating in the muddled context of this Supreme Court precedent, Sergio 
Hernandez’s family brought suit in the only forum possibly available to them,48 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. They 
alleged, among other claims, violation of Sergio’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights.49 The District Court granted Agent Mesa’s motion to dismiss.50 
At the Fifth Circuit, Judge Prado, writing for the court, upheld the 
petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claim, but dismissed the Fourth Amendment 
claim.51 The court used the three-factor test from Boumediene v. Bush.52 Based 
on this test, the court found that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment extends abroad, and that Sergio’s family had stated a claim 
regarding his deprivation of life without due process.53 Because of United States 
v. Verdugo-Urdiquez, however, which held that parts of the Fourth Amendment 
do not extend abroad, and which was not explicitly overruled by Boumediene, 
the court found the potential extraterritorial application Fourth Amendment 
more nuanced than the Fifth Amendment and dismissed that claim.54 
Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of the 
Fourth Amendment claim, but also dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim, 
holding that Sergio’s Fifth Amendment rights were not “clearly established,” 
as was required to overcome qualified immunity.55 The en banc panel wrote 
 
46 See id. at 764 (“[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism.”). 
47 See id. at 766. 
48 See Altholz, supra note 7, at 4 and accompanying text (“[N]o [Customs and Border 
Protection] agent has faced legal consequences in Mexico because the United States has refused to 
extradite the accused.”). 
49 Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 (W.D. Tx. 2011). 
50 See id. at 837. 
51 Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 267-72 (5th Cir. 2014). 
52 See Id. 
53 See Id. at 272. 
54 See Id. at 267. 
55 Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 120-21 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(“[T]he court . . . is unanimous in concluding that any properly asserted right was not clearly 
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that Boumediene was expressly limited to the Suspension Clause and thus had 
not extended other the Fifth Amendment abroad.56 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Hernandez 
v. Mesa, but did not reach the constitutional issue.57 Rather, the Court 
remanded with instructions for the Fifth Circuit to reconsider the Bivens 
aspect of the Fourth Amendment claim58 and the qualified immunity aspect 
of the Fifth Amendment claim.59 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that under Bivens, neither the Fourth 
nor the Fifth Amendment claims could proceed.60 Hernandez has filed a 
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which the Court granted in May, 
2019.61 The question is still left open, therefore, as to (1) whether claims must 
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than, and exclusively from, 
the Fifth Amendment in cross-border shooting cases and (2) whether either 
of these Amendments has force extraterritorially. 
Recently, a factually analogous case, Rodriguez v. Swartz, decided these 
constitutional questions explicitly.62 The facts of Rodriguez are in some ways 
even more stark than those in Hernandez. In October, 2012, a Mexican 
teenager was walking down a street that runs alongside the U.S.-Mexico 
border fence.63 Without warning, and with no interaction between the two 
parties, the agent fired ten shots into the teenager’s back and killed him.64 The 
district court denied the agent’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Fourth 
Amendment did apply to victims of cross-border shootings.65 The court 
employed a combination functional test from Boumediene and Verdugo-Urdiquez.66 
 
established to the extent the law requires.”). Qualified immunity is a doctrine that grants immunity 
to government officials from damages liability unless they have violated a plaintiff ’s “clearly 
established” constitutional right. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011). 
56 Id. at 121 (stating that nothing in Boumediene “presages. . . whether the Court would extend 
the territorial reach of a different constitutional provision- the Fifth Amendment.” 
57 Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S.Ct. 2003, 2006-07 (2017). 
58 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 
the Court implied a private right of action directly under the Constitution. The test for whether a 
Bivens claim can exist has been massively restricted since 1980. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 
(2017). 
59 This Comment is arguing for a novel approach to applying the constitution. I am therefore 
not arguing that Hernandez’s claim was “well-established” for purposes of qualified immunity, or 
whether the case presents novel questions that would preclude a Bivens claim in general. 
60 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
61  Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018), cert granted, 139 S. Ct. 2636 (U.S. May 28, 
2019) (No. 17-1678).   
62 Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (D. Ariz. 2015). 
63 See id. at 1028. 
64 See id. at 1029. 
65 See id. at 1041. 
66 See id. at 1037. 
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Because the court held that the Fourth Amendment applied, it did not reach 
the issue as to whether the Fifth Amendment applied abroad.67 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling.68 The court concluded that 
following Boumediene, its task was to analyze the victim’s citizenship and 
status, the location of the shooting, and “any practical concerns that arise” 
from applying the Fourth Amendment in this context.69 The court then easily 
distinguished Verdugo-Urdiquez, as the seizure of a person abroad did not 
involve any of the same “practical” considerations as applying the Warrant 
Clause abroad.70 Rather, the court found that “[a]pplying the Constitution in 
this case would simply say that American officers must not shoot innocent, 
nonthreatening people for no reason. Enforcing that rule would not unduly 
restrict what the United States could do either here or abroad,” and it found 
that the victim here was thus entitled to the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.71 Agent Swartz has petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court, but the Court has not granted certiorari as of this writing.72 If it does, 
the Court may have to squarely confront the constitutional question it 
avoided in Hernandez. 
In a slightly different context, in Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security,73 
a PhD student at Stanford was placed on the “No Fly List” and barred from 
returning to the United States after leaving to present her research results in 
Malaysia. The Ninth Circuit held that “the border of the United States is not a 
clear line that separates aliens who may bring constitutional challenges from 
those who may not,” and that under Boumediene and Verdugo-Urdiquez, Ibrahim 
was permitted to bring her First and Fifth Amendment claims in federal court.74 
Hernandez, Rodriguez, and Ibrahim show the uncertainty that has resulted 
from the Court’s jurisprudence as to extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution, and the ways in which Boumediene has been inadequate at 
resolving that uncertainty. 
 
67 See id. at 1038 (“In dismissing Rodriguez’ Fifth Amendment claim, this Court does not reach 
Rodriguez’ argument that J.A. should be entitled to protection under the Fifth Amendment’s 
prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life if this Court were to find that the Fourth 
Amendment did not protect J.A.”). 
68 See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 748 (9th Cir. 2018). 
69 Id. at 729. 
70 Id. at 731 (“There are many reasons not to extend the Fourth Amendment willy-nilly to 
actions abroad, as Verdugo-Urquidez explains. But those reasons do not apply to Swartz. He acted on 
American soil subject to American law.”). See also infra discussion and notes 75-84. 
71 Id. 
72 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Swartz v. Rodriguez No. 18-309 (appeal docketed Sept. 
11, 2018). 
73 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012). 
74 Id. at 995. 
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III. FOURTH VS. FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The earlier line of cases, from the Insular Cases through Reid v. Covert, do 
not provide a clear answer to a case like Hernandez v. Mesa. Large parts of 
Johnson v. Eisentrager focused on the petitioners’ enemy status, and large parts 
of Reid v. Covert focused on the petitioners’ citizenship status and the need 
for military courts to be “subservient” to civilian courts.75 That is to say, none 
of those cases directly addressed the status of someone who is neither a U.S. 
citizen nor an enemy combatant in a non-U.S. territory. The cases in the past 
two decades, culminating with Boumediene v. Bush,76 also developed in the 
context of war and questions of enemy status. It makes sense in some ways, 
then, why courts now would look to Verdugo-Urdiquez,77 which also dealt with 
a non-enemy alien in a nonmilitary context within a friendly country, to guide 
them in a case like Hernandez. 
Relying on Verdugo-Urdiquez, both the Fifth Circuit appellate panel and 
the en banc bench handily dismissed Hernandez’s Fourth Amendment claims. 
The primary concurring opinion to the en banc panel additionally held that 
deadly force claims can only be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, and 
so the Fifth Amendment claims must be dismissed as well.78 This analysis is 
flawed in two ways: (1) Application of Verdugo-Urdiquez does not preclude all 
application of Fourth Amendment abroad, and (2) A deadly force claim does 
not have to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, but could instead be 
analyzed under the Fifth Amendment. 
A. Verdugo-Urdiquez Does Not Hold That the Reasonableness Requirement in 
Deadly Force Cases is Limited Geographically. 
The right at issue in Verdugo-Urdiquez was freedom from government 
searches without a warrant. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which 
many take to be the controlling opinion after Boumediene,79 discusses how 
“impracticable and anomalous” it would be to require the U.S. government 
to go seek a warrant from a magistrate in furtherance of searches abroad. 
Kennedy did not doubt that the Fourth Amendment itself was designed to 
 
75 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1957). 
76 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
77 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
78 Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 121 (2015). 
79 Verdugo-Urquidez has been viewed by some as a case with no majority opinion, and because Justice 
Kennedy then wrote the majority opinion in the next extraterritorial application case, Boumediene, relying 
in large parts on his own concurring opinion from Verdugo-Urquidez, some view that opinion as the 
controlling precedent. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 13, at 975 (“Verdugo-Urquidez reflects the same lack of 
consensus about the proper scope of American constitutionalism . . . Substantial blocs of Justices 
subscribe to opposing theories, and no single approach attracts a majority.”). 
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ensure that “the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, 
whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.”80 And yet, he saw 
this principle as only the first step of an analysis that would also take into 
account the practical difficulties in enforcing certain provisions abroad.81 The 
“conditions and considerations” that made the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement impracticable and anomalous included the lack of American 
magistrates situated abroad, the differences in expectations of privacy 
between countries, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials.82 
Deadly force cases involving police shootings are also analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment, although obviously not under the Warrant Clause. 
Rather, the shooting officer’s actions are examined through a highly 
deferential lens of reasonableness.83 Deadly force claims do not need to take 
account of the location of magistrate judges, cooperation with other officials 
leading searches, or expectations of privacy. 
In a case like Hernandez, the interaction looks a lot like other police 
shooting cases; according to Mesa, he felt threatened and shot a fleeing 
suspect. There would be nothing impracticable or anomalous about applying 
the reasonableness requirement to scrutinizing Mesa’s actions that day.84 
Nothing about the officer’s state of mind should turn on the difference of sixty 
feet of distance across the border. The applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement in deadly force cases should not 
have been determined by the nonapplicability of the warrant requirement in 
search cases. The factors simply do not align, and the impracticable and 
anomalous standard cannot justify denial of the right at issue here. For lower 
courts to extend the Verdugo-Urdiquez analysis so far beyond its facts, to the 
extent that it prohibits claims based on deadly force, which involve absolutely 
none of the same considerations driving Justice Kennedy’s analysis, is illogical. 
B. Deprivation of Life Cases do not Need to Be Analyzed Exclusively  
Under the Fourth Amendment. 
The amalgam of decisions coming from the Fifth Circuit in this case leaves 
room for doubt about whether the Fourth Amendment must control this analysis. 
 
80 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277. 
81 Id. (“But this principle is only a first step in resolving this case.”). 
82 Id. at 278. 
83 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[T]here can be no question that apprehension by 
the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
84 See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, Swartz v. Rodriguez, No. 
18-309 (appeal docketed Sept. 11, 2018) (noting that federal regulations already require agents to 
treat citizens and noncitizens on both sides of the border equally in terms of use of force, and so it 
could hardly be impracticable or anomalous to impose the same limits through the Fourth 
Amendment). 
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The per curiam en banc decision dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim, relying 
on Verdugo-Urdiquez. Without deciding whether the Fifth Amendment applied 
abroad, the court dismissed that claim on the basis of qualified immunity, as the 
right was not clearly established at the time of the shooting.85 
The first concurring opinion, written by Judge Jones, disputed the per curiam 
opinion’s consideration of the Fifth Amendment at all due to the precedent of 
Graham v. Connor.86 Graham v. Connor was a § 1983 suit against a police officer 
for using excessive force. The petitioner claimed protection under the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments, but the Supreme Court held that “all claims that law 
enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of 
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment . . . rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ 
approach.”87 Using this language, Judge Jones thus wrote that Hernandez could 
not avail himself of the Fifth Amendment’s protections, and that his claims must 
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment alone. 
This total denial of access to the Fifth Amendment, however, “is rooted 
in a strained and incorrect reading of Graham.”88 As Judge Prado wrote in his 
majority opinion for the original Fifth Circuit opinion, and in his concurring 
opinion for the en banc court, Graham makes no such categorical mandate. In 
cases such as this one, where the court holds that the more explicit 
amendment is not applicable to the facts at hand, it is irrational to say that 
this is the only amendment that can apply. If the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to cases like that of Hernandez, because of Verdugo-Urdiquez, “then 
it cannot provide ‘an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ to 
persons in Hernández’s position, and Graham’s directive to apply the Fourth 
Amendment . . . is simply inapt.”89  
In United States v. Lanier,90 the Supreme Court explicitly stated that Graham 
v. Connor does not require that all claims of abuse by government officials be 
brought under the Fourth Amendment, but rather “simply requires that if a 
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as 
the Fourth Amendment . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard 
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due 
process.”91 In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,92 the Supreme Court applied the 
 
85 Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 121 (2015) (“There are cases in which it is plain 
that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such 
a right.” (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 237 (2009)). 
86 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
87 See id. at 395. 
88 Hernandez, 785 F.3d 117, 134 (Prado, J., concurring). 
89 Id. 
90 520 U.S. 259 (1997). 
91 Id. at 272 n.7 (emphasis added). 
92 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
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ruling from Lanier in allowing a claim to be brought under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because the death of a civilian by a police 
officer had not taken place during a seizure, and thus could not be analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment.93 In Hernandez, because the court held that the 
constitutional claim is not covered by the Fourth Amendment, Graham does not 
control and the Fifth Amendment analysis should be allowed to continue. 
In cross-border shooting cases, where federal court review is the only real 
opportunity plaintiffs have for redress, it is particularly inappropriate to use 
this type of catch-22 framework. Scholars have likewise noted the inherent 
contradiction in holding that Hernandez’s claim must be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment, and yet that the Fourth Amendment does not even reach 
the situs of the injury. It is explained as follows: 
The US government may not have its cake and eat it too. Either the [cross-border 
shooting] was a valid police action in terms of an investigatory stop because the 
United States was exercising de facto sovereignty at the border, and thus the 
Constitution should apply there . . . or it was not a seizure because there was no 
power to arrest, seize or stop the individual, and thus it becomes a question of not 
depriving an individual of life absent adequate due process. In either instance, the 
matter should be justiciable before a U.S. federal court.94 
Part of the difficulty in a case like Hernandez is that its facts do not 
comfortably situate it within either Fourth or Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In many ways it looks like a normal police shooting case, and 
yet the fact that the death took place abroad leads to an overly-complicated 
analysis under Verdugo-Urdiquez. 
On the other hand, the line of cases that has most directly dealt with 
government killings abroad, and has used the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause to do so, also does not perfectly square with the facts of 
Hernandez. This line of cases has to do with the use of drones to kill suspected 
terrorists abroad. In these cases, courts have held that no one is being “seized” 
in the Fourth Amendment use of the word; since unmanned aerial drones 
perform the killing, and there is never an intention to detain or seize the 
person being killed. As such, these cases have proceeded under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.95 A suspected terrorist being 
targeted by the federal government, perhaps surprisingly, has more due 
process rights than a fifteen-year-old child in Mexico, since in the case of a 
 
93 Id. at 843. 
94 Guinevere E. Moore & Robert T. Moore, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth 
Amendment: A Need for Expanded Constitutional Protections, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 22 (2014). 
95 See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 71 (2014) (holding that the plaintiff was not 
seized in the Fourth Amendment sense of the word, and so the claim should be analyzed under the 
Fifth Amendment). 
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drone killing, there are certain criteria the government must meet to satisfy 
due process.96 Like Hernandez, these drone cases also involve the allegedly 
arbitrary deprivation of life by the Executive against a civilian of a friendly 
country. The process of identifying a suspect and ordering a drone strike, 
however, is obviously different than an officer shooting someone during a 
face-to-face interaction. In many ways, Hernandez looks more like a police 
shooting case than a drone strike case, and yet there is no clear jurisprudence 
to dictate how it should be analyzed. 
For the remainder of this Comment, I will argue that in the context of these 
cross-border shootings, and extended executive nonmilitary action abroad 
generally, it is time to rethink the theories of the extraterritorial constitution. I 
will propose a purposive-oriented solution that would extend the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to cases like Hernandez and beyond. 
IV. THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION ABROAD 
A. Boumediene Fails to Provide a Theory of Constitutional Application Abroad 
As discussed above, Boumediene is the most recent Supreme Court case 
applying the Constitution abroad. Boumediene can be criticized both in its 
methodology and in its results, which are closely entwined. The functional test to 
decide whether a constitutional provision extends abroad takes into account (1) the 
citizenship of the detainee, (2) the nature of the site where detention took place, 
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in extending the provision abroad.97 This 
test, flexible in nature and ripe for manipulation, seems strange following a 
discussion about the fundamental structure of the Constitution and the separation 
of powers, which presumably would be implicated regardless of the factors present 
in a given scenario.98 Moreover, in the usual course of constitutional analysis, 
pragmatic and policy concerns are rarely the “primary metric” for determining 
whether a right is applicable at all, but rather are applied in determining how the 
right will be applied and enforced.99 
 
96 See Moore & Moore, supra note 94, at 17 (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder in explaining 
that a drone attack comports with due process when three elements are met: “the U.S. government has 
determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat . . . capture 
is not feasible; and . . . the operation would be . . . consistent with applicable law of war principles.”). 
97 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008). 
98 See Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 
36 YALE J. INT’L. L. 307, 317 (“Indeed, the Court’s three-factor functional test for determining the 
reach of the Suspension Clause virtually ignores the separation of powers concerns that purportedly 
were crucial to its analysis.”). 
99 See id. at 318 (“[P]ragmatic considerations normally enter constitutional analysis to 
determine how to apply and enforce a right, and not whether the right is applicable at all. [I]t is 
unusual for a court to use pragmatic, policy considerations as the primary metric for determining 
whether constitutional principles should be applicable . . . .”). 
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From the results perspective, the functionally focused test, separated from 
core constitutional concerns, has led to doubt about the extent of Boumediene. 
Subsequent cases have reached results at odds with Justice Kennedy’s 
constitutional concerns about separation of powers. A prominent example of 
Boumediene’s failings is the Executive’s use of detention in other countries. 
Learning the lessons of Boumediene, the Executive has engaged in exactly the 
type of manipulation it was admonished against. It does this by holding 
prisoners not at Guantanamo, but at far-flung locations such as Afghanistan, 
where it is able to avoid any constitutional accountability.100 
In the context of Hernandez v. Mesa, some have argued that Boumediene 
overrules Verdugo-Urdiquez in generally extending the Constitution abroad,101 
and have argued that under the three-factor test, the Constitution should have 
effect at the Southwestern border.102 The functional test from Boumediene is 
not a theory, however, and as we have seen from subsequent cases, it provides 
limited guidance for the future. The functional test has led and will lead to 
arbitrary results that will only increase the already unpredictable “mosaic” of 
extraterritorial constitutional application. 
Moreover, the functional approach does not provide enough protection to 
confront the reality of extensive U.S. government activity abroad. Because of 
the second factor, it is limited to very strange “constitutional black holes”103 
like Guantanamo, or potentially the span of a few hundred feet on the 
southern side of the border.104 With the U.S. government operating 
extraterritorially, including in nonmilitary capacities, to a degree never seen 
before, and certainly never anticipated by the Founders, a stronger and more 
cohesive constitutional theory is needed to address the rights of those brought 
into the long shadow of the government. 
 
100 See Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the Suspension Clause 
does not extend to U.S. military detention sites at the Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan). 
101 See, e.g., Netta Rostein, Note, Boumediene vs. Verdugo-Urquidez: The Battle for Control Over 
Extraterritoriality at the Southwestern Border, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 1371, 1392-93 (2016) (arguing that 
Verdugo-Urquidez’s formalistic test was incorporated as one of Boumediene’s factors). 
102 See generally Moore & Moore, supra note 94; Eva L. Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? 
The Constitution and Foreign Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229 
(2014); Brittany Davidson, Note, Shoot First, Ask Later: Constitutional Rights at the Border After 
Boumediene, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1547 (2015). 
103 See Philip Mayor, Note, Borderline Constitutionalism: Reconstructing and Deconstructing Judicial 
Justifications for Constitutional Distortion in the Border Region, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 647, 647 
(2011) (“The United States border functions like a sort of constitutional black hole: the closer one 
gets to it, the more constitutional norms are bent and warped.”). 
104 See Joseph C. Alfe, Extraterritorial Constitutionalism: A Rule Proposed, 50 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 787, 791-92 (2017) (proposing a rule that the Constitution applies only when there has been an 
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment in close proximity to or at a jointly-maintained 
U.S. Mexico Border area “as far as the bullet travels”). 
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B. A Survey of the Leading Theories 
The leading theories as to whether and when the Constitution should 
apply abroad do not satisfactorily address the issues described above. I will 
focus on the theories expounded by Gerald L. Neuman, in his book Strangers 
To The Constitution105 and his later article, Whose Constitution?106 Each theory 
has found support from Supreme Court Justices in different cases. Because 
Justice Kennedy wrote Boumediene, based on his own concurring opinion in 
Verdugo-Urdiquez, his theory, which Neuman calls “Global Due Process” 
might be seen as the leading theory right now, but there in no way is 
consensus throughout the courts or even among the current justices about 
which theory is superior.107 
1. Strict Territoriality 
Strict territoriality is the idea that the Constitution extends as far as the 
U.S. border and no further. It is most exemplified by a case called In re Ross,108 
which denied constitutional rights to someone serving on an American ship 
in Japan, convicted of murdering an American.109 For the period that strict 
territoriality held sway, it was rarely justified and was just accepted as the 
norm.110 Since Reid v. Covert, strict territoriality has been repudiated111 (and 
even before that, the Insular Cases introduced a more nuanced analysis 
through their discussion of fundamental rights). In Reid, the majority took 
the opportunity to note that Ross “cannot be understood except in its peculiar 
setting” and that “[a]t best, the Ross case should be left as a relic from a 
different era.”112 
2. Universalism 
Universalism holds that the Constitution should be applicable to every 
person on earth “in all the contexts in which (the U.S. government) interacts 
with them; not just when it seeks to apply its law, but also when it exercises 
 
105 NEUMAN, supra note 11. 
106 Neuman, supra note 13. 
107 See NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 97 (“In the case of American constitutionalism, conflicting 
conceptions of geographical scope have led to serious indeterminacy in the modern period.”). 
108 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
109 See id. at 464 (“By the Constitution a government is . . . established ‘for the United States of 
America,’ and not for countries outside of their limits. The guarantees it affords . . . apply only to citizens 
and others within the United States . . . [t]he Constitution can have no operation in another country.”). 
110 Neuman, supra note 13, at 918. 
111 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2017, 2044-45 (2005) (“[T]erritoriality suffered a crippling blow in Reid v.  
Covert . . . . ”). 
112 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1957). 
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military force against them or interacts consensually in a commercial or foreign 
aid context.”113 Neuman identifies Justice Brennan’s dissent in United States v. 
Verdugo-Urdiquez as exemplifying this theory. In his dissent, Justice Brennan 
focused on natural rights, and the idea that it is not the Constitution that gives 
humans their rights; those rights already existed, and the Constitution operates 
merely to restrain government action from infringing on those rights.114 
Neuman criticizes universalism “on both historical and normative grounds.”115 
He argues that nothing in the history or text of the Constitution suggests that 
it was designed to bind the U.S. government to a world order.116 
From a practical perspective, Universalism, in deciding that laws apply 
everywhere to everyone, without providing why, is “abdication, not 
analysis.”117 It could be that in certain situations, applying a foreign 
government’s law, and not the Constitution, would serve to better restrain the 
U.S. Government.118 It is also true that some parts of the Constitution make 
more sense to extend abroad than others. Universalism, and the natural rights 
ideas that imbue it, is a viable baseline from which to begin constitutional 
analysis. But it cannot replace the analysis itself. 
3. Membership 
Membership theory holds that constitutional rights depend on a contract 
between the governed and the governors. Neuman identifies Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Verdugo-Urdiquez as exemplifying this, in that 
it required voluntary ties from aliens in order for them to benefit from 
constitutional protections. This theory simply does not work for all 
constitutional provisions, however, many of which are not defined by who they 
apply to, such as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which protects everyone within U.S. territory regardless of citizenship 
status.119 This also ignores the natural law arguments, cited in the Brennan 
 
113 NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 110. 
114 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (“[T]he Framers of 
the Bill of Rights did not purport to ‘create’ rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to 
prohibit our Government from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing.”). 
115 See NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 110. 
116 Id. 
117 Roosevelt, supra note 111, at 2043. 
118 See, e.g., Anna Su, Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2014) (arguing that while the First Amendment could properly be 
extended abroad in some contexts, such as in using free speech principles to constrain U.S. 
government action, there are other contexts in which it would be an exercise of “cultural imperialism” 
to do so, such as “claiming its benefit in opposing foreign libel judgments that were obtained under 
laws that do not approximate First Amendment protections.”). 
119 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“is not confined to the protection of citizens” and its provisions “are universal in their application”). 
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Verdugo-Urdiquez dissent, that the Bill of Rights does not give individuals their 
rights, but rather tells the government what it can and cannot do. 
4. Municipality 
Municipality is Neuman’s preferred theory, and holds that constitutional 
rights apply in three contexts: “(i) [W]ithin United States territory, to all 
persons, (ii) to citizens of the United States everywhere in the world, and 
(iii) to aliens outside United States territory only in those circumstances in 
which the United States seeks to impose obligations upon them under United 
States law.”120 The Reid v. Covert plurality embodies this theory, in holding 
that U.S. citizens have constitutional rights no matter where they are in the 
world.121 This theory is also embodied by Justice Blackmun’s dissent in 
Verdugo-Urdiquez, where he wrote that once a foreign national is being 
punished for violations of U.S. law, he is now one of “the governed” and falls 
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.122 While an attractive model, it 
rests on the assumption that the government’s powers operate identically 
domestically and abroad. Centuries of jurisprudence have held the opposite- 
that a general power in foreign affairs derives from ideas of “sovereignty” and 
is distinct from the enumerated powers operating domestically.123 
5. Global Due Process 
Global Due Process has been described as “harmless universalism.”124 
Rather than apply all constitutional rights abroad, one would “recognize 
constitutional rights as potentially applicable worldwide, and then balance 
them away.”125 This could be done either on an ad hoc basis, or more 
categorically. The ultimate ideas is that all extraterritorial constitutional 
rights “boil down” to the right of procedural due process.126 
Global Due Process is essentially what Justice Kennedy advocated in his 
concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urdiquez, where he proposed a balancing test: apply 
 
120 See Neuman, supra note 13, at 919. 
121 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1980) (“[T]he Constitution in its entirety applied to the 
trials of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert.”). 
122 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 297 (1990) (“[T]he enforcement of 
domestic criminal law seems to me to be the paradigmatic exercise of sovereignty over those who 
are compelled to obey.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
123 See Roosevelt, supra note 111, at 2050-51 (discussing the problems with this theory and the 
Supreme Court precedent on general foreign affairs powers including United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.). 
124 Neuman, supra note 13, at 920. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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the constitutional provision, unless it is too “impracticable and anomalous.”127 The 
three-factor test Justice Kennedy developed in Boumediene has different 
considerations than the Verdugo-Urdiquez test.128 Ultimately, however, both these 
tests are doing the type of balancing from Global Due Process. 
The problems with Global Due Process are also the problems in the 
Kennedy-style balancing embodied in Boumediene. This approach “embodies 
judicial discretion to reject” potentially applicable constitutional rights, and 
“[t]he precise content of this standard cannot presently be specified.”129 
As elaborated by Justice Kennedy, this approach focuses on the practical 
consequences for the U.S. government of applying certain constitutional 
provisions. The individual rights of the Constitution were not written, 
however, to accommodate the convenience of the government as to if and 
when they might have to be respected. Neuman wrote, over twenty years ago, 
that the Global Due Process approach could create incentives for the U.S. 
government to undertake certain actions abroad, where it will be less 
accountable.130 This has obviously been borne to fruition—from 
Guantanamo, to the use of sites like the Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.131 
Even in cross-border shooting cases, it is important for the U.S. government 
to show that the bullet actually entered the child’s body on the Mexican, 
rather than on U.S. soil.132 The difference of sixty feet is what gives an officer 
impunity rather than liability, thanks to the balancing away of rights that 
comes when we start looking at the Constitution this way.133 The existence of 
constitutional rights begins to look more like the judicial branch’s 
accommodation of political compromise, and less like an inquiry into 
principles of constitutional interpretation.134 The result is an “unwritten 
constitution with a vengeance” that courts are ill-suited to apply.135 
 
127 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278. 
128 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (“(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee 
and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature 
of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles 
inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”). 
129 NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 114. 
130 Id. at 115. 
131 See Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the Suspension Clause 
does not extend to aliens held by the Executive at Bagram.). 
132 See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1033 (2015) (holding that the decedent was 
not seized when Swartz shot at him, but when the bullets entered his body, and “[a]s such, any 
constitutional violation that may have transpired materialized in Mexico”). 
133 See NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 116 (“[T]he global due process approach is asking the wrong 
question: the Court should not be inquiring as to which restraints present problems of practicality, 
but rather as to which rights a government must respect in order to justify its claim to obedience.”). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 117. (“It is hard to see why the justices would think that this task has been assigned to 
them or that they could perform it well.”). 
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Advocates for those abroad might see some due process as better than 
none.136 This is what is done when they argue that the three-factor test from 
Boumediene should apply to the border.137 On this one narrow strip of land, 
then, maybe one day the justices will find that there is enough control of the 
land to end categorical exclusion of children to constitutional protections 
from law enforcement officers.138 
V. CONFLICT OF LAWS APPROACH 
But rather than the ad hoc functionalist approach, which will inevitably 
lead to arbitrary results and government manipulation, we should instead 
look at the purpose of the constitutional provision to determine its 
applicability abroad. We can accomplish this using Interest Analysis, through 
the conflict of laws perspective. Interest analysis is better than the previously 
described theories, because it addresses the fairness, purpose, and 
practicability concerns of all these theories by focusing on the purpose of a 
constitutional provision and the results of its application in a specific 
circumstance. 
Conflict of laws has some analogies to the extraterritorial constitutional 
enterprise; over the course of the twentieth century, it has moved from formalism 
to functionalism,139 and it also lacks a clear and cohesive uniting theory.140 
A. Territoriality/Vested Rights Approach 
In the earliest version of choice-of-law theory, courts made decisions 
purely based on territoriality, while ignoring the content of the laws they were 
choosing between.141 The vested-rights/territorial approach, and its inherent 
problems, are shown by the case of Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. 
Carroll.142 In this case, an Alabama worker employed by an Alabama railroad 
 
136 Id. at 116 (“Advocates who consider half a loaf better than none may accept it.”). 
137 I believe this is what authors like Bitran and Moore are doing when they argue that the Boumediene 
framework applies at the border; it is an imperfect framework, but even so, it should apply to this highly 
unusual geographic location. It was also the analysis relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez. 
138 De facto control of land is a critical factor under the second factor from Boumediene, which looks at 
“the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place”. See Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 766. 
139 See generally Roosevelt, supra note, 111 (tracking the history of the extraterritorial application 
of the Constitution, and the history of conflict of laws methodology). 
140 See Kermit Roosevelt, Annual Brainerd Currie Lecture: Brainerd Currie’s Contribution to Choice 
of Law: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 65 MERCER L. REV. 501, 502 (2014) (“Many people think 
choice of law is a mess.”). 
141 Id. at 503 (“The law of that place creates rights–it vests them in the appropriate parties . . . 
theory is often called the vested-rights approach.”). 
142 97 Ala. 126 (1893). 
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was injured while passing through the state of Mississippi.143 Mississippi’s 
only connection to the case was as the situs of where the injury occurred. 
Nevertheless, under a territorial perspective, the Alabama court held that 
Mississippi law applied, which was less protective of workers than Alabama 
law, and the worker was thus barred from recovery.144 The decision is criticized 
for displaying how a person can arbitrarily be deprived of his rights. Instead of 
giving weight to the fact that an Alabama law was written for the purpose of 
protecting Alabama workers employed by Alabama companies, the mere location 
of the injury controlled.145 This territorial approach to conflicts of laws has largely 
faded away,146 and yet in a case like Hernandez v. Mesa, we can see the arbitrary 
results dictated by location of injury arise again. In Hernandez, each court had to 
address the location of the injury, acknowledging the fact that Mesa stood in the 
United States when he fired the shots, and was separated by mere feet from the 
supposed end of U.S. jurisdiction.147 The notion that constitutional rights designed 
to protect everyone, citizen and noncitizen alike, from executive government action 
would apply on one end of a sixty foot spectrum and not the other, is just as 
arbitrary as the much criticized and now dismissed logic of the Alabama case.148 
B. The Second Restatement 
The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws has moved toward a 
more functionalist approach than the early vested-rights/territorial approach. 
The Restatement provides seven factors that courts should consider in 
choosing the applicable law: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant 
policies of the forum,(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and 
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular 
issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies 
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and 
 
143 Id. at 127. 
144 Id. at 140. 
145 See Patrick J. Borchers, Legal Developments: The Return of Territorialism to New York’s Conflicts 
Law: Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 58 ALB. L. REV. 775, 785 (1995) (describing the “deficiencies” 
of a purely territorial approach, with the “inevitable result” of “a serious misjustice”). 
146 See Michael S. Green, The Return of the Unprovided-for Case, 51 GA. L. REV. 763, 765 (2017) 
(“Although dominant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, [the vested rights 
approach] is now retained by only around ten states.”). 
147 Hernandez, 757 F.3d 249, 269 (stating that Mesa stood in the United States when he fired the shots). 
148 See Eva Bitran, supra note 11, at 251 (noting that CBP agents cannot shoot someone in the United 
States without consequences, and how strange it would be if the Constitution did “not govern identical 
conduct by a border agent, simply because the victim was a few feet over the territorial boundary”). 
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uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the 
law to be applied.149 
The Second Restatement suffers from the same problems as, and is in 
many ways analogous to, the Global Due Process theory, and therefore with 
the functional test from Boumediene. The Second Restatement “lacks an 
underlying theory” and these seven factors (much like the three factors of 
Boumediene) leave courts to “grapple with the Section 6 factors on an ad hoc 
and intuitive basis.”150 
The problem with this approach as applied to Hernandez v. Mesa, is that 
the factors address priority (which of two laws should take precedence), but 
not scope (how far any given law extends). The Hernandez court does not 
need to ask about whether Mexican or U.S. law applies. Indeed, by refusing 
to extradite, the United States has not even allowed that possibility. We are 
simply asking what the scope is of what we know to be the applicable law: 
the U.S. Constitution. The Second Restatement cannot provide a guiding 
theory to give this field any more predictability or coherence than already 
exists post-Boumediene. 
C. Interest Analysis 
In contrast to the other approaches that make the substance of the laws 
secondary, interest analysis, now the leading approach,151 puts substance and 
policy “center stage.”152 Under this analysis, “court[s] should determine what 
policy a law was enacted to achieve in wholly domestic cases, and . . . whether 
its application to a case with foreign elements will promote its domestic 
purpose.”153 Unlike the Second Restatement, interest analysis allows us to 
consider the scope of a single law. Decisions about scope are “made in a way 
that advances the purposes” of the law in question.154 In order to decide the 
purpose of a provision, and whether it should apply in any given situation, 
the courts should engage in standard statutory interpretation and the decision 
should be made the same way as any other legal decision.155 This means that 
interest analysis, unlike the theories considered above, actually engages in 
 
149 RESTATEMENT SECOND CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. L. INST. 1969) 
150 KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 85 (2d ed. 2015). 
151 See Green, supra note 146, at 770 (“[F]orty states, as well as the District of Columbia, have 
adopted some form of . . . interest analysis . . . [t]o find out whether a jurisdiction’s officials have 
chosen to extend their law to the facts of a conflicts case.”). 
152 Roosevelt, supra note 140, at 507. 
153 Roosevelt, supra, note 111, at 2065. 
154 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and 
Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 336 (1997). 
155 Id. at 349-50 (explaining how “interest analysis brings nothing more than the standard 
method of modern legal interpretation to choice of law”). 
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constitutional interpretation by considering the substance, context and 
purpose of the law at issue. 
D. Application of Interest Analysis to Hernandez v. Mesa 
Under interest analysis, we need to look at the domestic purpose of the 
constitutional provision at issue and ask whether that purpose would be 
served by extending the provision abroad. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment holds that “No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”156 It is widely accepted that the use of the word “person” connotes a 
broad reading, applicable to citizens and noncitizens alike, and so within the 
United States, there is no question that the this clause applies to 
noncitizens.157 Knowing that the power of the Due Process Clause does not 
diminish within the United States depending on whom the executive action 
is directed against, interest analysis would have us ask why that purpose of 
the constitutional provision suddenly switches off once we move beyond the 
U.S. border? If we, via the Constitution, are interested in keeping the 
Executive from arbitrarily killing someone, why would sixty feet of distance 
differentiate between behavior we restrain and behavior we do not? If we are 
interested in an Executive that in general is held accountable for arbitrary 
killings, then the purpose behind the Clause is served by enforcing that 
accountability no matter where the Executive acts.158 
The core of the Due Process Clause is to “secure the individual from the 
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”159 This remains true whether 
that arbitrariness is caused by a lack of procedure (procedural due process) or 
by executive action that is so unjustified as to “shock[] the conscience,” also 
called substantive due process.160 By requiring that the Executive adhere to 
 
156 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
157 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242, (1896) (“The term ‘person,’ used 
in the [F]ifth [A]mendment, is broad enough to include any and every human being within the 
jurisdiction of the republic . . . . This has been decided so often that the point does not require 
argument.”) (citations omitted); see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process 
as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1721 (2012) (“The Fifth Amendment is silent about whom 
it prohibits from depriving rights ‘without due process of law.’ The passive voice suggests that the 
Amendment is not limited as to ‘who,’ but only as to ‘what.’”); Major David C. Collver, Judging 
Alleged Terrorists: Applying the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to Lethal Deliberate Targeting, 223 
MIL. L. REV. 897, 912 (“The Fifth Amendment uses the term ‘person,’ instead of ‘citizen’ or ‘the 
people,’ and it means something different from those two latter terms.”). 
158 This is especially true (1) in close geographic proximity to the United States and (2) when 
the action is carried out by a nonmilitary, domestic police force that is not engaged in any act of war. 
159 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998). See also Collver, supra note 157, at 
899-900 (“Nowhere is killing by executive whim so clearly confronted as in the Fifth Amendment, 
which mandates that the federal government provide due process before depriving any person of life.”). 
160 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. 
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the procedural and substantive requirements of the Clause, fair decisions are 
more likely to be promoted, and the Executive is kept from “being used for 
purposes of oppression.”161 The concept of Due Process and its purpose to 
restrain executive action dates back to Magna Carta.162 
Within U.S. territory, citizens and noncitizens alike are entitled to the 
protections of the Due Process Clause.163 Procedural due process 
requirements follow the familiar three factor test from Mathews v. Eldridge,164 
and substantive due process claims are examined under the “shock the 
conscience” test.165 Both these analyses are highly context specific, and allow 
a wide deference to the executive actor.166 While in the administrative 
immigration context, the Mathews v. Eldridge test leads to relaxed procedural 
requirements,167 it has not seriously been debated that noncitizens are entitled 
to Due Process since at least 1896.168 
Knowing that citizenship does not matter for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause, the question then becomes why there should be a territorial boundary 
on restraining arbitrary government action. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court 
spoke of the dangers that would flow from defining the scope of constitutional 
rights solely based on formal sovereignty of a territory. To allow 
constitutional rights to change depending on whether the land was controlled 
by the United States or not would be to give the political branches “the power 
 
161 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). 
162 Id. (explaining the “traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its 
forebear in the Magna Carta . . . was ‘intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the 
powers of government”); see also Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 
24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911) (tracing the history of the Due Process Clause to Magna Carta). 
163 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien enters the country . . . the 
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164 494 U.S. 319, 335 (1975) (requiring consideration of “the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action,” “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used,” and “the Government’s interest, including the . . . burdens that the additional or substitute 
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165 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
166 See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Conduct that ‘shocks in 
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before any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking.”). 
167 See Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77-79 (“The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected 
by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy 
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168 See Wong Wing, supra note 157. See also United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of 
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) (“Deportation without a fair hearing or on charges 
unsupported by any evidence is a denial of due process. . . .”). 
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to switch the Constitution on or off at will.”169 In Boumediene, the provision 
at issue, the Suspension Clause, was also designed in order to restrain the 
executive. As such, the Court wrote that “the test for determining the scope 
of this provision must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power 
it is designed to restrain.”170 These words of warning ring just as true for the 
Due Process Clause. The Fifth Amendment is essential in maintaining the 
separation of powers and preventing an unrestrained, oppressive executive.171 
To allow it to be “switched on and off” because a bullet entered a body sixty 
feet from the end of formal sovereignty is a perversion of its purpose. It is 
exactly the manipulation that Boumediene warned of and that we have seen 
time and time again since that decision. 
Our domestic interest in a restrained executive is served by restraining 
arbitrary action wherever it takes place. Agents in these cross-border shooting 
cases have no idea whether they are shooting a U.S. citizen or not when they 
so quickly fire their weapons.172 It is antithetical to the purpose of the Fifth 
Amendment that their entire legal liability should depend on their “luck” that 
the person they killed was sixty feet away and not a U.S. citizen.173 
Those who favor a territorial Constitution often warn of the unspeakable 
liability that could be created by extending the Constitution abroad. The 
United States government is active across the globe, and they claim that the 
floodgates would open if we allow everyone who interacts with our 
government to share in our constitutional protections. Where the United 
States has taken some sort of positive action against a foreign citizen, 
however, it seems that constitutional rights must be the “unavoidable 
correlative” of the government’s power to enforce laws in the first place.174 
If we, as U.S. citizens, wish to be governed by the type of restrained, 
limited government envisioned by the Founders, there must be constraints 
on that government in any action it takes. Even recent history can show us 
the ways that U.S. citizens are harmed when the executive is given carte 
blanche to act abroad.175 We see time and time again that what the 
 
169 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008). 
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described above. 
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174 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 282 (1990)(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
175 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Striking down the U.S. Government’s 
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government does “to aliens today provides a precedent for what can and will 
be done to citizens tomorrow.”176 
Moreover, the Due Process Clause is flexible enough to account for 
context; demanding that the executive adhere to its standards is the minimum 
we should be able to expect from a government that is “entirely a creature of 
the Constitution.”177 
Because the purpose of the Due Process Clause is served domestically by 
restraining arbitrary executive action full stop, interest analysis holds that the 
Clause should apply abroad. 
CONCLUSION 
Interest analysis, unlike the Boumediene test, would extend the scope of 
the Fifth Amendment beyond the strange “constitutional black hole” of the 
Southwestern Border. It would create predictability and eliminate the 
arbitrary and inconsistent results that have stemmed from that case. Unlike 
other theories, interest analysis engages in constitutional interpretation in 
deciding which provisions apply abroad based on their purpose, without 
bowing to the practical and political concerns that have no rightful place 
in constitutional theory. 
It is federal courts that are responsible for ensuring justice for victims’ 
families in these cases. As the Executive increases its activities at the border 
and beyond, we must recognize the inadequacy of the precedent up to this date, 
and make a thoughtful inquiry into what we, as U.S. citizens, demand and 
expect from our government. By using interest analysis and examining the 
domestic purpose of our Constitution, we can ensure that grave miscarriages of 
justice, like that imposed on the Hernandez family, do not continue. 
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